پایگاه تخصصی سیاست بین الملل (  INPO  )‌

زبان تخصصي :‌ ( بین الملل گرایی 4 ) Cosmopolitanisms

3.1 Political cosmopolitanism

It is often argued that it is impossible to change the current system of states and to form a world-state or a global federation of states. This claim is hard to maintain, however, in the face of the existence of the United Nations, the existence of states with more than a billion people of heterogeneous backgrounds, and the experience with the United States and the European Union. So in order to be taken seriously, the objection must instead be that it is impossible to form a good state or federation of that magnitude, i.e., that it is impossible to realize or even approximate the cosmopolitan ideal in a way that makes it worth pursuing and that does not carry prohibitive risks. Here political cosmopolitans disagree among themselves. On one end of the spectrum we find those who argue in favor of a strong world-state, on the other end we find the defenders of a loose and voluntary federation, or a different system altogether.

The defenders of the loose, voluntary and noncoercive federation warn that a world-state easily becomes despotic without there being any competing power left to break the hold of despotism (Rawls). Defenders of the world-state reply that a stronger form of federation, or even merger, is the only way to truly exit the state of nature between states, or the only way to bring about international distributive justice. Other authors have argued that the focus among many political cosmopolitans on only these two alternatives overlooks a third, and that a concern for human rights should lead one to focus instead on institutional reform that disperses sovereignty vertically, rather than concentrating it in all-encompassing international institutions. On this view, peace, democracy, prosperity, and the environment would be better served by a system in which the political allegiance and loyalties of persons are widely dispersed over a number of political units of various sizes, without any one unit being dominant and thus occupying the traditional role of the state (Pogge).

Of the objections brought up by non- or anti-cosmopolitans, two deserve special mention. First, some authors argue that the (partial or whole) surrender of state sovereignty required by the cosmopolitan scheme is an undue violation of the principle of the autonomy of states or the principle of democratic self-determination of their citizens. Second, so-called ‘realists’ argue that states are in a Hobbesian state of nature as far as the relations among them are concerned, and that it is as inappropriate as it is futile to subject states to normative constraints. To these objections cosmopolitans have various kinds of response, ranging from developing their alternative normative theory (e.g., by arguing that global democracy increases rather than diminishes the democratic control of individual world citizens) to pointing out, as has been done at least since Grotius, that states have good reasons even on Hobbesian grounds to submit to certain forms of international legal arrangements.
3.2 Economic cosmopolitanism

Various arguments have been used to show that economic cosmopolitanism is not a viable option. Marx and later Marxists have argued that capitalism is self-destructive in the long run, because the exploitation, alienation, and poverty that it inflicts on the proletariat will provoke a world-wide revolution that will bring about the end of capitalism. In the twentieth century, when nationalist tendencies proved to be stronger (or in any case more easily mobilized) than international solidarity, and when the position of workers was strengthened to the point of making them unwilling to risk a revolution, this forced the left to reconsider this view.

Critics of the economic cosmopolitan ideal have also started to emphasize another way in which capitalism bears the seeds of its own destruction within itself, namely, insofar as it is said to lead to a global environmental disaster that might spell the end of the human species, or in any event the end of capitalism as we know it. The effects of excessive consumption (in some parts of the world) and the exploitation of nature would make the earth inhospitable to future human generations.

Even if one does not think that these first two problems are so serious as to make economic cosmopolitanism unviable, they can still make it seem undesirable in the eyes of those who are concerned with poverty and environmental destruction.

Moreover, there are several other concerns that lead critics to regard economic cosmopolitanism as undesirable. First among these is the lack of effective democratic control by the vast majority of the world's population, as large multinationals are able to impose demands on states that are in a weak economic position and their populations, demands that they cannot reasonably refuse to meet, although this does not mean that they meet them fully voluntarily. This concerns, for example, labor conditions or the use of raw materials in so-called Third World countries.

Second, economic cosmopolitans are accused of failing to pay attention to a number of probable side-effects of a global free market. In particular, they are criticized for neglecting or downplaying issues such as (a) the presupposition of large-scale migration or re-schooling when jobs disappear in one area (the loss of ties to friends and family, language, culture, etc., and the monetary costs of moving or re-tooling), (b) the lack of a guarantee that there will be a sufficient supply of living-wage jobs for all world citizens (especially given increasing automation), and (c) the problem of the detrimental effects of income disparities. They are similarly accused of failing to take seriously the fact that there might be circumstances under which it would be profitable for some states to be protectionist or wage war, such as wars about markets or raw materials and energy (e.g., oil).
3.3 Moral cosmopolitanism

Another version of the criticism that cosmopolitanism is impossible targets the psychological assumptions of moral cosmopolitanism. Here it is said that human beings must have stronger attachments toward members of their own state or nation, and that attempts to disperse attachments to fellow-citizens in order to honor a moral community with human beings as such will cripple our sensibilities. If this is a viability claim and not simply a desirability claim, then it must be supposed that moral cosmopolitanism would literally leave large numbers of people unable to function. So it is claimed that people need a particular sense of national identity in order to be agents, and that a particular sense of national identity requires attachment to particular others perceived to have a similar identity. This argument seems plausible if it is assumed that cosmopolitanism requires the same attitudes towards all other human beings, but moderate cosmopolitanism does not make that assumption. Rather, the moderate cosmopolitan has to insist only that there is some favorable, motivating attitude toward all human beings as such; this leaves room for some special attitudes towards fellow-citizens. Of course, the strict moral cosmopolitan will go further and will deny that fellow-citizens deserve any special attitudes, and it might be thought that this denial is what flouts the limits of human psychology. But this does not seem to be true as an empirical generalization. The cosmopolitan does not need to deny that some people do happen to have the need for national allegiance, so long as it is true that not all people do; and insofar as some people do, the strict cosmopolitan will say that perhaps it does not need to be that way and that cosmopolitan education might lead to a different result. The historical record gives even the strict cosmopolitan some cause for cheer, as human psychology and the forms of political organization have proven to be quite plastic.

In fact, some cosmopolitans have adopted a developmental psychology according to which patriotism is a step on the way to cosmopolitanism: as human individuals mature they develop ever wider loyalties and allegiances, starting with attachments to their caregivers and ending with allegiance to humanity at large. These different attachments are not necessarily in competition with each other. Just as little as loyalty to one's family is generally seen as a problematic feature of citizens, so the argument goes, loyalty to one's state is not a necessarily problematic feature in the eyes of cosmopolitans. Thus, cosmopolitanism is regarded as an extension of a developmental process that also includes the development of patriotism. This claim is just as much in need of empirical support, however, as the opposite claim discussed in the previous paragraph.

Often, though, the critic's arguments about psychological possibility are actually run together with desirability claims. The critic says that the elimination of a special motivating attachment to fellow-citizens is not possible, but the critic means that the elimination of special motivating attachments to fellow-citizens will make a certain desirable form of political life impossible. To respond to this sort of argument, the cosmopolitan has two routes open. First, she can deny the claim itself. Perhaps the viability of politics as usual depends not upon certain beliefs that fellow-citizens deserve more of one's service, but upon commitments to the polity itself. If strictly cosmopolitan patriotism is a possibility, it lives in a commitment to a universal set of principles embodied in a particular political constitution and a particular set of political institutions. If such commitment is enough for desirable politics, then the anti-cosmopolitan is disarmed. But second, the cosmopolitan can of course also deny the value of the form of political life that is posited as desirable. At this point, moral commitments run over into a discussion of political theory.

Occasionally it is said that cosmopolitans are treasonous or at least unreliable citizens. But many recognizably cosmopolitan theses (that is, the moderate ones) are consistent with loyalty to fellow-citizens, and even the strictest cosmopolitan can justify some forms of service to fellow-citizens when they are an optimal way to do good for human beings (who happen to be fellow-citizens, and not because they are fellow-citizens).

This last criticism can be developed further, however, and tailored specifically to target the strict cosmopolitan. If the strict cosmopolitan can justify only some forms of service to fellow-citizens, under some conditions, it might be said that she is blind to other morally required forms or conditions of service to fellow-citizens. At this point, the critic offers reasons why a person has special obligations to compatriots, which are missed by the strict cosmopolitan. Many critics who introduce these reasons are themselves moderate cosmopolitans, wishing to demonstrate that there are special obligations to fellow-citizens in addition to general duties to the community of all human beings. But if these reasons are demanding enough, then there may be no room left for any community with all human beings, and so these objections to strict cosmopolitanism can also provide some impetus toward an anti-cosmopolitan stance. Because there are several such reasons that are frequently proposed, there are, in effect, several objections to the strictly cosmopolitan position, and they should be considered one-by-one.

The first narrow objection to strict cosmopolitanism is that it neglects the obligations of reciprocity. According to this argument, we have obligations to give benefits in return for benefits received, and we receive benefits from our fellow-citizens. The best strictly cosmopolitan response to this argument will insist on a distinction between the state and fellow-citizens and will question exactly who provides which benefits and what is owed in return. On grounds of reciprocity the state may be owed certain things — cooperative obedience — and these things may in fact generally benefit fellow-citizens. But the state is not owed these things because one owes the fellow-citizens benefits. One does not appropriately signal gratitude for benefits received from the state by, say, giving more to local charities than to charities abroad because charity like this does not address the full agent responsible for the benefits one has received, and does not even seem to be the sort of thing that is commensurate with the benefits received. In assessing this exchange of arguments, there are some significantly difficult questions to answer concerning exactly how the receipt of benefits obliges one to make a return and concerning how the benefits one receives from one's state affect the acceptability of emigration.

A second objection to strict moral cosmopolitanism gives contractarian grounds for our obligations to fellow-citizens. Because actual agreements to prioritize fellow-citizens as beneficiaries are difficult to find, the contractarians generally rely upon an implicit agreement that expresses the interests or values of the fellow-citizens themselves. So the contractarian argument turns on identifying interests or values that obligate fellow-citizens to benefit each other. Perhaps, then, it will be argued that citizens have deep interests in what a successful civil society and state can offer them, and that these interests commit the citizens to an implicit agreement to benefit fellow-citizens. The strict cosmopolitan will reply to such an argument with skepticism about what is required for the civil society. Why is more than cooperative obedience required by our interests in what a successful state and civil society can provide? Surely some citizens have to dedicate themselves to working on behalf of this particular society, but why can they not do so on the grounds that this is the best way to benefit human beings as such? Perhaps an intermediate position here is the (Kantian) view that it is morally necessary to establish just democratic states and that just democratic states need some special commitment on the part of their citizens in order to function as democracies, a special commitment that goes beyond mere cooperative obedience but that can still be defended in universalist cosmopolitan terms. The acceptability of this type of view, however, will depend on whether one finds convincing the underlying Kantian political theory.

The final argument for recognizing obligations to benefit fellow-citizens appeals to what David Miller has called ‘relational facts.’ Here the general thought is that certain relationships are constituted by reciprocal obligations: one cannot be a friend or a brother without having certain friendship-obligations or sibling-obligations, respectively. If fellow-citizenship is like these other relations, then we would seem to have special obligations to fellow-citizens. But this argument, which can be found in Cicero's De Officiis, depends upon our intuitions that fellow-citizenship is like friendship or brotherhood and that friendship and brotherhood do come with special obligations, and both intuitions require more argument. Frequently, these arguments appeal to alleged facts about human nature or about human psychology, but these appeals generally raise still further questions.

In sum, a range of interesting and difficult philosophical issues is raised by the disputes between cosmopolitans of various stripes and their critics. As the world becomes a smaller place through increased social, political, and economic contacts, these disputes and the issues they raise will only become more pressing.
Bibliography
Historical works

* Augustine. De Civitate Dei Libri XXII. Ed. A. Kalb. Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1929. Translated as The City of God against the Pagans. Ed. and trans. R.W. Dyson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
* Bentham, Jeremy. Principles of International Law. In The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. John Bowring, vol. 2, 535-560. New York: Russell & Russell, 1962.
* Chrysippus. See (Stoics).
* Cicero. De Officiis. Ed. M. Winterbottom. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. Translated as On Duties. Ed. and trans. M.T. Griffin and E.M. Atkins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
* Cloots, Anacharsis. Oeuvres. München: Kraus Reprint, 1980.
* (Cynics). In Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae, Ed. G. Giannantoni, vol. 2. Naples: Bibliopolis, 1990. For an English translation of the most important source of fragments and testimonia, see Book Six of Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers. Trans. R.D. Hicks. 2 vols. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1925.
* Dante. Monarchy. Ed. and trans. Prue Shaw. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
* Diogenes the Cynic. See (Cynics).
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On the History of Cosmopolitanism

* Baldry, H.C. The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965.
* Brown, Eric. “Hellenistic Cosmopolitanism.” in A Companion to Ancient Philosophy, ed. Mary Louise Gill and Pierre Pellegrin (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 549-558.
* -----. “Socrates the Cosmopolitan.” in Stanford Agora: An Online Journal of Legal Perspectives 1 (2000).
* -----. Stoic Cosmopolitanism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
* Heater, Derek. World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought. New York: St. Martin's, 1996.
* Heuvel, Gerd van den. “Cosmopolite, Cosmopolitisme.” In Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680-1820, ed. Rolf Reichardt and Eberhard Schmidt, 41-55. München: Oldenbourg, 1986.
* Kleingeld, Pauline. “Approaching Perpetual Peace: Kant's Defence of a League of States and his Ideal of a World Federation.” European Journal of Philosophy 12 (2004): 304-325.
* -----. “Kant's Cosmopolitan Law: World Citizenship for a Global Order.” Kantian Review 2 (1998): 72-90.
* Meinecke, Friedrich. Cosmopolitanism and the National State. Trans. Robert B. Kimber. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.
* Moles, J.L. “Cynic Cosmopolitanism.” In The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy, ed. R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé, 105-120. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996.
* -----. “The Cynics.” In The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, ed. Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield, 415-434. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
* -----. “The Cynics and Politics.” In Justice and Generosity, ed. André Laks and Malcolm Schofield, Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy, 129-158. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
* Nussbaum, Martha C. “Kant and Cosmopolitanism.” In Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal, ed. James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, 25-57. Cambridge: MIT, 1997.
* Schlereth, Thomas J. The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought: Its Form and Function in the Ideas of Franklin, Hume, and Voltaire, 1694-1790. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977.
* Schofield, Malcolm. The Stoic Idea of the City. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

On the Taxonomy of Cosmopolitanisms

* Kleingeld, Pauline. “Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany.” Journal of the History of Ideas 60 (1999): 505-524.
* Scheffler, Samuel. “Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism.” Utilitas 11 (1999): 255-276. reprinted in his Boundaries and Allegiances (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 111-130.

On Contemporary Cosmopolitanisms, For and Against

* Appiah, Kwame A. Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers. New York: W.W. Norton, 2006.
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* -----. Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.
* Benhabib, Seyla. The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
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* Brock, Gillian, and Brighouse, Harry. The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
* Cabrera, Luis. Political Theory of Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Case for the World State. London: Routledge, 2004.
* Caney, Simon. Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
* Cheah, Pheng, and Bruce Robbins, eds. Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998.
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* De Greiff, Pablo, and Cronin, Ciaran, eds. Global Justice and Transnational Politics: Essays on the Moral and Political Challenges of Globalization. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002.
* Gewirth, Alan. “Ethical Universalism and Particularism.” Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988): 283-302.
* Gilbert, Margaret. “Group Membership and Political Obligation.” Monist 76 (1993): 119-131.
* Goodin, R.E. Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social Responsibilities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.
* -----. “What is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?” Ethics 98 (1988): 663-687.
* Habermas, Jürgen. “Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit of Two Hundred Years' Hindsight.” In Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal, ed. James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, 113-53. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997.
* Hayden, Patrick. Cosmopolitan Global Politics. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005.
* Held, David. Cosmopolitanism: A Defence. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003.
* -----. Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.
* Jones, Charles. Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
* Kleingeld, Pauline. “Kantian Patriotism.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 29 (2000): 313-341.
* Kymlicka, Will. Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
* MacIntyre, Alasdair. “Is Patriotism a Virtue?” In Theorizing Citizenship, ed. Ronald Beiner, 209-228. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995.
* Margalit, Avishai, and Joseph Raz. “National Self-Determination.” Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990): 439-61.
* Martin, Rex, and Reidy, David, eds. Rawls's Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia?. Malden: Blackwell, 2006.
* Mason, Andrew. “Special Obligations to Compatriots.” Ethics 107 (1997): 427-447.
* McKim, Robert, and Jeff McMahan, eds. The Morality of Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
* Miller, David. On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
* Miller, Richard W. “Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 27 (1998): 202-224.
* Moellendorf, Darrel. Cosmopolitan Justice. Boulder: Westview Press, 2002.
* Nathanson, Stephen. Patriotism, Morality, and Peace. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993.
* Nussbaum, Martha C. Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006.
* Nussbaum, Martha C., et al. For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism. Ed. Joshua Cohen. Boston: Beacon Press, 1996. revised version of The Boston Review 19,5 (Oct/Nov 1994).
* O'Neill, Onora. Bounds of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
* Pogge, Thomas W. “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty.” Ethics 103 (1992): 48-75
* -----. Realizing Rawls. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989.
* Pogge, Thomas W., ed. Global Justice. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001.
* Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.
* Scheffler, Samuel. Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
* Shue, Henry. Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy. 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
* Singer, Peter. One World: The Ethics of Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.
* -----. Practical Ethics. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
* Tamir, Yael. Liberal Nationalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.
* Tan, Kok-Chor. Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and Patriotism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
* Unger, Peter. Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
* Vertovec, Steven, and Cohen, Robin, eds. Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context, and Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
* Waldron, Jeremy. “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative.” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 25 (1992): 751-93.
* -----. “Special Ties and Natural Duties.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 22 (1993): 3-30.
* -----. “Who is my Neighbor? - Proximity and Humanity.” The Monist 86 (2003): 333-54.